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It has been proposed that a functional overlap exists in the brain for temporal and spatial
information processing.To test this, we designed two relative categorization tasks in which
human subjects and a Rhesusmonkey had to assign time intervals or distances to a “short”
or “long” category according to varying prototypes.The performance of both species was
analyzed using psychometric techniques that showed that they may have similar percep-
tual, memory, and/or decision mechanisms, specially for the estimation of time intervals.
We also did a correlation analysis with human subjects’ psychometric thresholds and the
results imply that indeed, temporal and spatial information categorization share neural sub-
strates. However, not all of the tested distances and intervals correlated with each other,
suggesting the existence of sub-circuits that process restricted ranges of distances and
intervals. A different analysis was done on the monkey data, in which the inﬂuence of
the previous categorical prototypes was measured on the task currently being performed.
Again, we found a signiﬁcant interaction between previous and current interval and dis-
tance categorization. Overall, the present paper points toward common or at least partially
overlapped neural circuits for temporal and spatial categorization in primates.
Keywords: time and space, categorization, psychophysics, Rhesus monkeys
INTRODUCTION
Moment by moment our brain is presented with uncountable
stimuli that contain spatial and temporal information. The pro-
cessing of these magnitudes is basic for successful behavior and it
has been proposed that common neural mechanisms are used for
their measurement. Evidence supporting this hypothesis, some-
times referred to as A Theory of Magnitude or ATOM (Walsh,
2003), comes from very different sources. Elapsed time is widely
represented graphically in spatial coordinates and our language
contains many metaphors that speak of time as a spatial magni-
tude and vice versa (Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Vallesi et al.,
2008). Also, patients with brain lesions affecting spatial processing
show accompanying deﬁcits in temporal estimation (Basso et al.,
1996) and the opposite case, enhanced magnitude processing, has
also been reported in synesthetes (Teuscher et al., 2010; Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2011). This suggests that indeed, similar neural cir-
cuits are engaged when time and space are quantiﬁed. Among the
structures that have been involved in these circuits are the pre-
frontal cortex and the posterior parietal cortex, particularly in the
right hemisphere (Bueti and Walsh, 2009).
However, some challenges have been made to this theory (Cor-
rea and Nobre, 2008). An issue that has not been addressed is the
degree of overlap in theprocessingof thesemagnitudes. If time and
space are regarded as similar dimensions by the brain, then par-
ticular time intervals should be equivalent to particular distances
and vice versa. While much research has been done regarding the
neural mechanisms behind the quantiﬁcation of different time
scales (Gibbon et al., 1997; Buonomano and Karmarkar, 2002;
Buhusi and Meck, 2005), there are, to our knowledge, no reports
of separate substrates for the processing of distinct spatial scales.
At least four different mechanisms have been proposed to account
for timing in different ranges, from microseconds to circadian
rhythms. Do all of these timing mechanisms also process spatial
magnitudes? If so, which range of distances is quantiﬁed by them?
An issue that has already been investigated is the inﬂuence that one
magnitude exerts over the other. Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008)
tested human subjects on six different tasks that required subjects
to reproduce either the length or the duration of visual stimuli.
They found that the spatial features of the stimuli had a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on subjects’ temporal estimates, but not the other way
around. These results imply that there is an asymmetrical depen-
dence inwhich temporal processing requires somedegree of spatial
representation. On the other hand, Rhesus monkeys did not seem
to present this bias, since they were equally affected by irrelevant
temporal or spatial information in their magnitude estimations
(Merrit et al., 2010).
In the present work, we designed two categorization tasks in
which time intervals in the millisecond range or distances in the
millimeter range had to be categorized as“short”or“long”accord-
ing to previously acquired prototypes. These tasks were performed
by human subjects and one rhesus monkey. The rationale behind
our approach is that categorization tasks arewell characterized and
allow the analysis of various psychophysical measures. Further-
more, categorization is one of themost commonperceptualmech-
anisms in humans and consists in mentally grouping environmen-
tal stimuli into clusters known as categories. In the middle of a
category lies a representative element, known as prototype, which
has the greatest percentage of relevant features that characterize the
category. Also, categories have limits or boundaries beyond which
similar elements are not considered as members (Kéri, 2003). In
fact, investigators have long hypothesized that the assignment of a
particular stimulus to a category may be done either by comparing
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it to the prototype, the boundaries, or to the members in the cat-
egory (Ashby and Maddox, 2005). Importantly, categorization is a
relative and dynamic process, since the same object can be part of
different and even opposed groups depending on the current con-
text (Maddox, 2002; Roy et al., 2010). Many species are capable of
categorization and Rhesus monkeys have been trained to perform
different categorization tasks (Merchant et al., 1997; Romo et al.,
1997; Freedman et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2004). The aim of this
research was two-fold: ﬁrst, we wanted to determine the similari-
ties and differences in spatial and temporal categorization between
both species. Second, we studied whether different psychophysical
measures supported the notion of a common or a partially over-
lapped mechanism for magnitude processing. Our results point
that both species do share some mechanisms for temporal and
spatial categorization and that these magnitudes inﬂuence each
other. They also propose that a particular range of time intervals
may be considered as equivalent to speciﬁc distances.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
HUMAN SUBJECTS
Participants
Twenty-ﬁve human subjects [13F, 12M; age 25.36± 3.49 years
(mean± SD)] with normal or corrected vision volunteered for
this study. All subjects were right-handed and gave written con-
sent before commencement of experiments. The study complied
with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the National
University of Mexico Institutional Review Board.
Materials
We programmed two categorization tasks using Visual Basic
(Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0, 1998) for the presentation of stim-
uli and behavioral data collection. All the tasks were performed in
front of a computer monitor (HP 7540, 160 Hz refresh rate) with
the chin and the forehead placed in a custom-made headrest that
kept the subject’s eyes approximately 56 cm from the center of the
monitor. A joystick (H000E-NO-C, CTI electronics, Stratford, CT,
USA) was manipulated by the subject to control the position of
the cursor.
Tasks
All subjects were tested on the Temporal (TCT) and Spatial (SCT)
CategorizationTasks. In both tasks, subjects had to categorize eight
different stimuli as“short”or“long,”the ﬁrst four values being con-
sidered as “short” (see Table 1). In the case of SCT, subjects had
to categorize eight different distances between two vertical bars,
whereas in TCT they had to categorize eight different time inter-
vals between the ﬁrst and the second appearance of the bars. The
temporal sequence of a trial was the same for both tasks (Figure 1).
A circle appeared in the center of the screen with the cursor, rep-
resented by a small red dot, under it. The subject decided when
to begin the trial by placing and maintaining the cursor inside the
central circle. After a variable delay (500+Δ 1,000 ms), two paral-
lel bars (8˚× 0.7˚ of visual angle) separated by a particular distance
appeared brieﬂy (50 ms) above the central circle, disappeared for
a particular interval, and reappeared in the same position. In the
SCT, the interval was kept constant in all the trials (669 ms) but the
distance between the bars varied from trial to trial and could be
any of the eight distances. In the TCT the opposite happened: the
Table 1 |Time and distance values used inTCT and SCT in human
subjects.
Intervals forTCT (ms) Distances for SCT (visual angle)
T1 (350) T2 (685) T3 (1195) S1 (2.85) S2 (4.8) S3 (6.9)
200 1.8
250 2.1
319 2.7
331 2.8
369 2.9
381 3
450 450 3.7 3.7
500 500 4 4
619 4.6
669 4.7
706 4.9
756 5.1
870 870 5.7 5.7
920 920 6 6
981 6.6
1169 6.8
1231 7.1
1419 7.3
1470 7.9
1520 8.2
The value in parentheses for each set corresponds to the implicit value, which
was never actually presented to the subjects. Note that in each set, two values
are shared with another block (shaded in gray). However, in one set these values
belong to the “short” category and in the other block those same values belong
to the “long” category.
distance was kept constant (6˚ of visual angle), but the interval var-
ied from one trial to the next. To help distinguish between tasks,
the stimuli and the central circle were yellow in SCT and green
in TCT. In both tasks, after a 1-s delay, two response circles were
presented above the central circle. The leftmost circle represented
the “short” category, whereas the rightmost represented the “long”
category. The subject had to move the cursor to the response circle
that matched the category of the stimulus, that is, the category of
the trial’s distance in the SCT or the interval in the TCT, based
on previously acquired prototypes and boundaries (see below).
Subjects were instructed to maintain their gaze in a ﬁxation point
located inside the central circle during trial execution.
In order to categorize the stimuli, subjects ﬁrst had to acquire
a criterion. To accomplish this, the ﬁrst 24 trials were part of
the “Training Phase” in which only the shortest and the largest
distances or intervals, corresponding to the category prototypes,
were presented in an alternate fashion. We expected that in this
way, subjects generated a mental implicit value, that is the distance
or the interval midway between the two prototypes presented,
which would serve as a limit or boundary between categories (see
Table 1). The correct response circle was highlighted to the sub-
ject with a green outline while the incorrect one had a red outline.
When the subject placed the cursor inside the correct circle, the
word “correct” appeared under the central circle. Otherwise, the
word “incorrect” would be read. The 96 trials that followed were
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in a trial of the CategorizationTasks. In
SCT the distance between the bars changes from trial to trial but the
interval is the same in all trials. In TCT the interval varies from trial to trial
but the distance between the bars remains constant. Humans reported
their decision by introducing the cursor inside the leftmost circle if they
categorized the stimulus as “short” or inside the rightmost circle if they
categorized it as “long.” The monkey moved the cursor toward the circle
with an orange outline if its decision was “short” and toward the circle
with a blue outline if its decision was “long.” Depicted are the eight
possible positions that the response circles could adopt in the monkey
response conﬁguration. In a particular trial only the two response circles
were visible.
regarded as part of the “Testing Phase,” in which the eight values
were presented randomly from trial to trial. Each value appeared
12 times and the 96 trials constitute one block. In this phase, both
response circles had a green outline, so the only information avail-
able to the subject to solve the task was the distance or the interval.
No feedback was provided during this phase.
We captured the relative nature of the categorization process in
the following way: We created three different sets containing eight
stimuli values each, for both tasks (labeled S1, S2, and S3 for the
SCT and T1, T2, and T3 for the TCT). The values in these sets were
arbitrarily deﬁned after preliminary tests with human subjects in
which the aim was to obtain sigmoid-shaped psychometric curves.
Only one set of stimuli was used in a particular block of trials (see
Table 1). The three sets used on each task represent a continuum
across the space or time spectrum and, importantly, were partially
overlapped: the two shortest and the two longest values of the
middle set were exactly the same as the two longest values of the
ﬁrst set and the two shortest values of the third set, respectively.
Thismeans that one particular value could be correctly categorized
either as “short” or as “long” depending on the context, that is on
the particular set being used in that block. All subjects did both
tasks with the three sets for a total of six blocks. The order in which
the tasks were performed was assigned randomly for each subject
but they decided howmany sessions they needed to complete them
(two or three).
Analysis
Subroutines written in Matlab (MathWorks v. 7.6.0.324) and the
SPSS statistical package (version 17, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA,
2008) were used for statistical analyses. The psychophysical rela-
tive threshold was calculated for each subject and for each block
of trials from the subject’s psychometric curve, where the prob-
ability of long-interval categorization was plotted as a function
of the stimulus magnitude. A logistic function was ﬁtted to these
data, and the relative threshold was computed as half the sub-
traction of the interval or the distance at 0.75p and at 0.25p. The
psychophysical relative threshold is a measure of the amount of
change that a stimulus must have in the studied dimension to be
detected by the subject. In addition, the point of subjective indif-
ference (PSE) was calculated as the interval or distance at 0.5p
in the psychometric curves. Then, the constant error was deﬁned
as the difference between the PSE minus the implicit interval or
distance.
The relative thresholds of each subject on each of the six blocks
were used in a correlation analysis. The rationale behind this analy-
sis is that if a common system is being used to solve these tasks,
then a subject’s performance must be very similar throughout the
six blocks. The level of statistical signiﬁcance to reject the null
hypothesis was α= 0.05.
MONKEYS
Participant
One male Rhesus monkey (Macaca mulatta, 5.5 kg) was tested.
All the experimental procedures were approved by the National
University of Mexico Institutional Animal Care and Use Commit-
tee and conformed to the principles outlined in the Guide for Care
and Use of Laboratory Animals (NIH, publication number 85–23,
revised 1985).
Materials
The monkey performed the tasks using the same instruments as
humans. It was seated in a primate chair with its head restrained
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by a head halo. The position of its gaze was monitored through-
out the experiments with an infrared eye scanner (ISCAN, Inc.,
Woburn, MA, USA).
Tasks
The monkey performed TCT and SCT. The sequence of events in
a trial was almost identical to the one described for humans with
one exception: in this case, the outline of one response circle was
now orange and was associated with the “short” category, whereas
the other circle’s outline was blue and was associated with the
“long” category. In this way, the response circles’ position could
be varied on each trial without losing the stimulus–response asso-
ciation. Each circle could occupy one of eight possible locations
around the central circle (see Figure 1). This manipulation was
implemented to dissociate possible relationships between the cat-
egorization process and the motor implementation of the decision
communication in future neurophysiological experiments. Dur-
ing the “Training Phase,” the color of the stimulus bars matched
the color of the correct target, forcing the monkey to make a
color-category association. Again, only the extreme values were
presented during this phase, helping the monkey to create a men-
tal implicit value. In the “Testing Phase” the color of the stimulus
bars was always the same as the central circle’s, that is yellow
in SCT and green in TCT, regardless of the stimulus category.
Correct trials were rewarded in both phases with drops of juice,
with a greater amount delivered in the Testing Phase because of
the greater difﬁculty of these trials. Also, in TCT, reward was
adjusted to be proportional to the set of values being catego-
rized in order to avoid a preference for the shorter intervals:
blocks performed with T2 gave the monkey more juice than T1
blocks, but less juice than T3 blocks. It is important to mention
that the values used in TCT were the same as the ones used by
humans. However, the values used in SCT were slightly larger
(Table 2).
Training
The monkey was trained using classical conditioning techniques
with drops of juice as a reward for every correct trial. Food was
provided ad libitum in its cage but water was only available during
training sessions. Body weight was strictly controlled and extra
water was provided if needed. The monkey was trained 6 days
a week for sessions of 2–3 h of duration in which it consumed
around 200 ml of juice (see Zarco et al., 2009). We ﬁrst deter-
mined hand dominance by placing the monkey in the primate
chair in front of the computer monitor with the joystick at arm-
reaching distance and rewarding joystick grasping, which it did
preferentially with its right hand. After that, training proceeded
with its left arm restrained and the following increasingly com-
plex behaviors were sequentially rewarded: First, the monkey had
to move and maintain the cursor inside a yellow central circle.
Then, it had to move the cursor to a response circle that appeared
at random positions in the periphery. The color of this circle could
be either blue or orange from trial to trial. The next step was wait-
ing inside the central circle for the presentation of the two-bar
stimulus, which also varied randomly in color between blue and
orange, before moving to the single response circle. Even though
the stimulus was irrelevant at this time, its’ color and that of the
Table 2 | Distance values used in SCT with the monkey.
Distances for SCT (visual angle)
S1 (3.9) S2 (5.9) S3 (8)
2.8
3.1
3.7
3.8
4
4.1
4.7 4.7
5 5
5.6
5.7
6
6.1
6.7 6.7
7 7
7.6
7.8
8.1
8.3
8.9
9.2
The value in parentheses for each set corresponds to the implicit value, which
was never actually presented. Again, each block shares two values with another
block (shaded in gray). However, in one block they belong to the “short” category
and in the other to the “long” category. Time interval values (not shown) were
the same as for humans (seeTable 1).
response circle always matched. The distance between the bars and
their color were also co-varied, so when the color was orange, the
distance was short (1.8˚ of visual angle, the shortest distance of
set S1) and when the color was blue, the distance was long (8.2˚
of visual angle, the longest distance of set S3). Learning this took
around 1 month.
A new level of difﬁculty was introduced by presenting the two
response circles, orange and blue, simultaneously with a 1-s delay
after stimulus presentation in pseudorandom positions around
the central circle. The stimulus then became relevant, since the
monkey had to remember its color and take the cursor to the
response circle that matched it. This task was essentially the same
as the “Training Phase”of SCT. The monkey learned this rule after
approximately 5 months of training.
Once this had been achieved, we surgically implanted three
head posts for skull ﬁxation to a halo that maintained the mon-
key’s head in the same position during training (see Merchant
et al., 2001 for details in the surgery). This allowed us to train the
monkey to ﬁxate its gaze in a window centered in the middle of
the monitor. If the monkey exited this window before the presen-
tation of the response circles, the trial was aborted and the ﬁxation
point ﬂashed brieﬂy. The diameter of this window was system-
atically reduced until the monkey performed the tasks with a 4˚
diameter window. We then introduced testing trials in which the
color of the bars was the same as the central circle’s and the only
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information available to solve the task was the distance between
them. The monkey had to take the cursor to the orange circle if
the distance was short and to the blue circle if the distance was
long. This task was essentially the same as the “Testing Phase”
of SCT and it was done initially with the two extreme distances
mentioned above. Once the monkey had learned the rule, we
progressively shortened the difference between the “short” and
“long” distances, added intermediate distances, and used different
“short” and “long” prototypes for particular blocks of trials until
the monkey was performing SCT with the three different value
sets. However, after several weeks of training, the monkey rarely
did the task using S1 values with a performance above chance. This
forced us to increase slightly the distances tested (Table 2). Reach-
ing a stable performance with blocks above 70% of correct trials
took around 6 months. Once this task had been learned, training
in TCT was started from the “Training Phase.” The central circle
was now green and only two extremely different intervals (200 and
1520 ms) were presented from trial to trial. Again, when the short
interval was presented, the stimulus bars were orange and when
the long-interval was presented, the bars were blue. Training then
proceeded in the same fashion as for SCT, with the progressive
introduction of testing trials and the three different sets of inter-
vals. In the end, around 2 years were needed for the monkey to
perform the two tasks.
Analysis
As for humans’ data, subroutines written in Matlab (MathWorks
v. 7.6.0.324) and the SPSS statistical package (version 17, SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA, 2008) were used for the statistical analyses.
Again, the psychophysical relative threshold was used as a measure
of the monkey’s sensitivity. The PSE and the constant errors were
also obtained as described for humans. In this case, the thresholds
and constant errors were calculated for 19 blocks in the TCT and
seven blocks in the SCT where the three set of stimuli showed a
performance above 70% of correct trials and were computed in
the same way as for humans. The level of statistical signiﬁcance to
reject the null hypothesis was α= 0.05.
RESULTS
HUMAN AND MONKEY PERFORMANCE
Twenty-ﬁve human subjects and one monkey were tested on
two relative categorization tasks in which either time intervals
or distances in the millisecond and millimeter range respec-
tively, were categorized as “short” or “long” according to pre-
viously instructed prototypes. Figure 2A shows the psychome-
tric curves of both species for the three sets of values of TCT,
in which the same stimuli were categorized by human subjects
and the monkey. It can be seen that the curves are very similar
across species, following the typical sigmoid shape characteris-
tic of psychometric functions. Also, the slope of these curves
decreases as a function of the values being categorized which
implies that the scalar property is present in temporal catego-
rization. This is more evident in Figure 2C, where the rela-
tive thresholds of the three curves are plotted as a function of
the implicit value of the corresponding set of stimuli. Indeed,
an ANOVA was carried out using the thresholds as dependent
variable and the species as factors, and the results showed no
signiﬁcant differences in the timing thresholds between human
subjects and monkeys [F(1,130)= 2.22, p = 0.138]. In addition,
linear regressions between the timing threshold and the three
implicit intervals were performed for each human subject and
for each behavioral run in the monkey. Then, we performed
ANOVAs where the slope or the intercept of such regressions
were the dependent variable and the specie was the factor. The
results showedno signiﬁcant differences between species in neither
the slope [F(1,42)= 1.73, p = 0.196] nor the regression intercept
[F(1,42)= 0.001, p = 0.978], suggesting that the psychometric
behavior in humans and Rhesus monkeys was very similar for
interval categorization.
The scenario was different for spatial categorization. Figure 2B
shows the psychometric curves for SCT of both species. Again,
both species present sigmoid-shaped curves, but the slope is evi-
dently steeper for humans than for monkeys, especially for the
larger distances. As shown in Figure 2D, the relative thresholds
were larger in the monkey than in human subjects [ANOVA,
F(1,94)= 133.9, p< 0.0001]. However, as was the case in TCT, the
spatial relative thresholds also showed an increase as a function of
the implicit distance, and therefore, we performed linear regres-
sions between these parameters for each human subject and across
behavioral runs in the monkey. The corresponding ANOVAs
showed a signiﬁcant increase in the regression slope [ANOVA,
F(1,30)= 9.43,p = 0.005] and intercept [ANOVA,F(1,30)= 6.73,
p = 0.015] in the monkey with respect to human subjects. These
results indicate that the categorization of distances between spatial
stimuli was not as precise in macaques as in humans, at least for
the range tested in the present study. Nevertheless, Weber’s law is
evident in both species.
On the other hand, we compared the constant error between
species for the SCT and TCT (Figures 2E,F). Positive and nega-
tive constant errors are associated with under- and overestima-
tion, respectively. For the TCT this measure was close to zero
across implicit intervals in human subjects, whereas it showed
a linear decrease as a function of the implicit interval in the mon-
key. The ANOVA showed marginal differences between species
[F(1,130)= 3.88, p = 0.051]. In contrast, during the SCT the con-
stant error showed a linear decrease as a function of implicit
distance in both species with no signiﬁcant differences between
humans and monkeys [F(1,94)= 1.99, p = 0.161]. Overall, the
constant error across implicit values was very close to zero for
both species and tasks, which means that their estimation of the
implicit value was very accurate.
To summarize, these ﬁndings suggest that the neural mecha-
nisms for temporal categorization are similar between human sub-
jects and macaques. Both species showed similar relative thresh-
olds and a similar increase in temporal variability as a function
of the implicit interval, following the scalar property of interval
timing. In contrast, the monkeys showed larger relative thresholds
for the SCT that could be due to differences in the processing of
spatial information, the memory storage of spatial prototypes, or
the decision process.
HUMAN SPACE–TIME INTERACTIONS
Previous studies have found that individual differences in the vari-
ability of execution of different timing are correlated (Keele et al.,
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FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Psychometric curves of the human subjects and the
monkey for the three sets of values used in TCT (A) and SCT (B). (C,D)
Relative thresholds duringTCT (C) and SCT (D) as a function of the implicit
values used in both species. (E,F) Constant error as a function of implicit
values duringTCT (E) and SCT (F); the horizontal line at zero corresponds to
perfect accuracy. For thresholds and constant errors the lines correspond to
the best linear regression models. Human subjects are depicted in solid lines
and ﬁlled circles and the monkey in dotted lines and open circles.
1985; Spencer and Zelaznik, 2003; Merchant et al., 2008). This
means that subjects that are good timers in one behavioral context
are good timers in another one. Thus, the existence of signiﬁcant
intra-subject correlations in the temporal variability across dif-
ferent timing tasks has been taken as an indication of a common
timing mechanism. In the present paper we used the individual
variation in the thresholds for temporal and spatial categorization
in order to determine whether there was a common magnitude
mechanism across tasks. Correlations were carried out on the
Z -scored relative threshold in order to analyze the precision of
individual subjects between pairs of tasks.
Figure 3 shows the correlation matrix obtained from the com-
parison of the psychophysical relative thresholds of all the subjects
in all the tasks. Three important results stem from this analy-
sis: First, the three TCT sets were signiﬁcantly correlated with each
other (Pearson R T1–T2= 0.694; T2–T3= 0.348; T1–T3= 0.454),
a result that goes in accordance with the timing literature that
proposes that at a single neural mechanism deals with time
FIGURE 3 | Correlation matrix showing the Pearson R value in a
grayscale (inset, right) for all possible pairwise block comparisons.
Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant correlations (*p≤0.05, **p ≤0.01).
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processing in the hundreds of milliseconds range (Gibbon et al.,
1997). In contrast, in the case of SCT only S2 and S3 correlated
signiﬁcantly with each other (R = 0.338). Importantly, these were
also the sets that correlated with the sets used for TCT. S2 cor-
related with T2 (R = 0.378) and S3 correlated with all three TCT
sets (T1–S3= 0.421; T2–S3= 0.378; T3–S3= 0.344). Blocks done
with S1 values did not correlate with any other of the SCT or the
TCT blocks.
These results support the hypothesis that at least in some scales
temporal and spatial processing may be supported by common
neural circuits. Furthermore, the fact that only some sets of dis-
tances correlated with each other and with the sets of intervals
used, suggests that there may be sub-circuits specialized for the
processing of narrow sub-ranges of distances and intervals which
would be considered as equivalent magnitudes.
MONKEY SPACE–TIME INTERACTIONS
Due to the long training period in the monkey, it was impossi-
ble to use the individual differences in the performance variability
between tasks to test whether a common magnitude mechanism
exists across multiple Rhesus monkeys. Instead,we took advantage
of the thousands of trials performed by themonkey in the SCT and
TCT. The approach followed was to evaluate the effects of the set
of values used in the previous block over the categorization perfor-
mance of the current block during its initial and ﬁnal trials within
the SCT and TCT blocks, and then to determine the space–time
interactions on this measure of categorization carryover. For this
purpose, we ﬁrst computed the normalized value of the difference
in the number of correct trials between long minus short stimuli
for the 20 initial test trials in the current block. A negative value
of this normalized categorization bias indicates that the previous
block-prototypes had an underestimation effect on the initial exe-
cution of the current block, whereas a positive value indicates an
overestimation effect from the previous to the current categoriza-
tion block. Indeed, Figure 4A shows that when the previous block
was larger than the current one, there was a signiﬁcant underes-
timation of the current block stimuli (t -test, p< 0.05), whereas
when the previous was smaller than the current block there was a
signiﬁcant overestimation on the current block (t-test, p< 0.05).
These effects were similar within the TCT (ﬁlled circles) and SCT
(open circles) and were more evident between the sets T1 and T3,
and between S1 and S3 (P>> and P<<, respectively) as shown in
Tables 1 and 2. In contrast, when the normalized categorization
bias was computed for the last 20 trails of the current block no
signiﬁcant under- or overestimation carryover effect was observed
(Figure 4B). These results suggest that the previous short and
long prototypes, within spatial or temporal categorization, had an
initial inﬂuence on the current categorization performance, gener-
ating a bias that was congruent with the magnitude of the previous
minus current block difference. The results also suggest that the
inﬂuence of previous categorization prototypes was washed-out
during task performance using newly instructed prototypes.
FIGURE 4 | Normalized categorization bias as a function of the
difference between the previous and current blocks of stimuli. (A)
Normalized bias for the initial 20 trials of the current block for TCT (solid
circle) and SCT (open circle). (B) Normalized bias for the last 20 trials of the
current block for TCT (solid circle) and SCT (open circle). In both (A,B) the
ordinate labels correspond to the notation PnAn, where P is for previous
and A for actual stimulus, and n is the set number. (C) Normalized bias for
the initial 20 trials of the current block, when the current wasTCT and the
previous SCT (i.e., S3–T1 corresponds to a current T1 and a previous S3).
(D) Normalized bias for the initial 20 trials of the current block, when the
current was SCT and the previousTCT. The number of runs analyzed for
each combination is depicted on top of each panel; for (A,B) the black and
gray numbers correspond toTCT and SCT, respectively. *p ≤0.1,
** p ≤0.05.
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The next step was to evaluate whether the normalized cate-
gorization bias showed the same under/overestimation between
the spatial and temporal categorization performance. The results
showed that when the previous block was SCT and the current
was TCT, there was congruent under- and overestimation on the
initial 20 trials of the current block, with signiﬁcant effects for
the extreme magnitudes (S3 and T1, S1 and T3, t -test, p< 0.05;
Figure 4C). These cross-magnitude carryover effects were smaller
when the previous block was TCT and the current was SCT
(Figure 4D).
These ﬁndings support the notion of a common magnitude
mechanism across space and time, where the storage in memory
of categorical prototypes from a previous block of trials of space
has an inﬂuence on the current categorization performance of
time. Consequently, it is possible that the memory representation
of categorical prototypes has a similar neural representation for
the two magnitudes.
DISCUSSION
Many previous papers have addressed the ability of Rhesus mon-
keys to categorize a wide variety of stimuli, from concrete objects
(Freedman et al., 2001) to abstract entities (Romo et al., 1997;
Freedman and Assad, 2006). In the same line, the ﬁrst impor-
tant result of our work is that the monkey was able to categorize
time intervals and distances. In fact, its performance in TCT was
comparable to humans’. This implies that their timing, memory,
and decision mechanisms may be very similar to ours, at least
for the processing of single intervals. In this respect, results from
our own laboratory (Zarco et al., 2009) have pointed out that
monkeys are capable of producing timed movements, but their
performance is signiﬁcantly better when single, rather than mul-
tiple intervals, are generated. In turn, this may be a consequence
of the ecological signiﬁcance of timing for both species. While
humans need to explicitly time multiple intervals for complex
behaviors, such as dance or language,monkeys rarely processmore
than one interval.
The monkey was not as good in the SCT as it was in TCT.
It required a distance of a minimum of 2.8˚ of visual angle to
have a performance above 70%, whereas humans had no problem
categorizing distances below 2˚. This may also be related to the
environment in which the two species live, with humans manip-
ulating tools, discriminating letters, and handling objects much
smaller than monkeys do. Of course, a possibility exists that this
particular monkey was not good at categorizing distances. How-
ever, preliminary results with a second monkey show a similar
trend. Yet, the monkey was able to correctly categorize the spatial
magnitude and, in the same way as humans, presented an increase
in the relative threshold which means it is in accordance with
Weber’s law.
The constant errors, a measure of the accuracy of the cat-
egorization, showed that both species performed well in their
estimation of the implicit values for each set. However, a tendency
to underestimate the smaller values and to overestimate the larger
ones was found for both tasks in monkeys, but only for SCT
in humans. It has been argued the constant error is adjusted
constantly as a function of the previous tasks, which reﬂects
the inﬂuence of the global context on the current state of the
system (Jones and McAuley, 2005). In this regard, it is pos-
sible that our experimental design accounts for some of the
observed differences: the monkey performed at least six blocks
per session, which would be sufﬁcient for the constant error
to be adjusted and minimized around the middle values. In
contrast, humans normally performed only two or three blocks
per session which would prevent the inﬂuence of previous
blocks.
Another relevant ﬁnding is that there is a correlation between
distance and interval categorization inhumans. These results are in
accordance with the hypothesis of an overlapped neural mecha-
nism for the processing of these two magnitudes. However, not
all the distances and intervals that we tested shared the same
behavior. Categorization of distances below 3.7˚ of visual angle
did not correlate with categorization of larger distances nor with
any of the intervals. Conversely, larger distances not only cor-
related with each other but also with the time intervals used.
This points toward possible subsets of the hypothetical magni-
tude processing circuits, each of which would be responsible for
the quantiﬁcation of different subscales. In this regard, distances
in the 3.7–8.2˚ range may share the same neural substrate for esti-
mation as intervals around 200 and 1520 ms. However, the degree
of overlap may not be that straightforward. Distances between
3.7˚ and 6˚ only correlated with larger distances and with inter-
vals between 450 and 920 ms. While more research is needed to
support this notion, this result goes in hand with ﬁndings describ-
ing progressively wider tuning curves for the processing of bigger
magnitudes (Nieder and Merten, 2007; Bartolo and Merchant,
2009; Merchant et al., 2011). In this sense, circuits that quan-
tify larger distances would also be used to measure a broader
range of intervals. Results obtained by Casasanto and Borodit-
sky (2008) may be considered as complementary to ours. They
analyzed the inﬂuence that distances in the 7˚ to 27˚ range and
intervals between 1,000 and 5,000 ms had on the estimation of
each other. One of their results implies that for the 3,000 ms inter-
val performance was best when presented together with a distance
of 27˚ (800 pixels at the viewing distance and monitor resolution
reported).
Finally, we investigated the carryover effect of the previous
prototypes on the initial categorical performance with different
current sets of values for the monkey. Within the spatial or tem-
poral magnitudes the carryover found suggests an interference
of the memory representation of the previous over the current
prototypes. This interference might be due to the competition
for the same neural substrates between the memory representa-
tion of the prototypes within each magnitude. In fact, a large
set of studies in motor control have suggested that the inter-
ference between movement parameters in adaptation tasks of
position-dependent visuomotor rotations (Tong et al., 2002) and
velocity-dependent force ﬁelds (Brashers-Krug et al., 1996; Shad-
mehr and Brashers-Krug, 1997) are an evidence of shared neural
resources for the encoding of these parameters. In addition, as
in these motor adaptation tasks, we found a washout effect of
the previous over the current block performance, emphasizing
the dynamic and labile nature of the working memory repre-
sentation of categorical prototypes. More importantly, the results
also showed a cross-magnitude carryover effect of the previous
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spatial prototype on the initial performance of the current set of
temporal stimuli but not the other way around. This is a similar
ﬁnding to Casasanto and Boroditsky’s (2008) for human subjects
but not for monkeys (Merrit et al., 2010). They attribute this
space–time asymmetry in humans to a metaphorical represen-
tation of more abstract entities, such as time, with entities that
can be perceived through the senses, such as space. They also pro-
pose several explanations for the absence of this asymmetry in
monkeys, among them language-related differences and the lack
of mental time-travel abilities. However, the fact that we found a
greater inﬂuenceof spaceon temporal categorization in the trained
monkey implies that this asymmetry may be rooted in the neural
circuits formagnitude processing, irrespective of language or other
complex abilities. Of course, our results come from only one mon-
key and more animals need to be tested in these and similar tasks.
Nevertheless, these data support the hypothesis of a common or
partially overlapping neural mechanism for the working memory
storage of categorical information of time and space. Hence, the
present ﬁndings increase the list of psychophysical approaches to
study the nature of common neural underpinnings of complex
variables, such as time and space, using categorization behavior
(Wright et al., 1997; Nagarajan et al., 1998).
To conclude, using different analytical approaches in human
subjects and monkeys we have found evidence that implies that
the primate brain uses a common or partially overlapping mech-
anism to represent categorical information about space and time.
In addition, the results showed that the categorization abilities of a
Rhesus monkey are similar to human subjects’, especially for inter-
val durations. Hence, the present paper indicates that the Rhesus
monkey is a goodanimalmodel for studying thebasis of spatial and
temporal categorization. Indeed, the ﬁnal goal of our research pro-
gram is the neurophysiological study of the brain signals behind
these highly complex cognitive abilities.
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